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Understanding economic development strategies and how they affect the growth 
prospects of an economy is essential. But finding a recipe to promote economic   
growth and development that is applicable across countries is a complex task. The topic 
is the focus of a large and growing literature, e.g., Dixit (2007), Rodrik (2007) and 
Easterly (2006, 2009). This paper contributes to this discussion by analysing the 
Dominican Republic’s successful economic development experience in modern 
democratic times—comprising the second half of the twentieth century and the 
beginning of the new millennium.  
The Dominican Republic is a relevant country to study as a role model of development 
success given the many legacies and characteristics that it shares with other developing 
economies. While experiencing the same challenges, the Dominican Republic has 
enjoyed comparatively rapid economic growth and improvements in a variety of 
development indicators. Examples include life expectancy gains, rising from 59 years in 
1970 to 72 years by 2007 (World Development Indicators 2009),1 reductions in the 
percentage of the population, aged 15 to 24, considered illiterate from 21.5 per cent in 
1970 to 7.4 per cent in 2005 (UNESCO)2 and sustained levels of rapid per capita real 
GDP growth. Figure 1 plots the latter from 1969 through 2003 using World Penn data.  
Of note is comparative economic information, displayed in Table 1, revealing that the 
Dominican Republic ranks as the fastest growing economy in Latin America, averaging 
3.2 per cent per annum over the 1970–2003 period. As a yardstick, Panama’s growth 
was only 2.44 per cent per year and Chile’s 2.23 per cent. Yet the figures in Table 1 
reveal that economic growth in the Dominican Republic has been relatively stable as 
indicated by the standard deviation of the growth rate over the period. While the country 
was not immune to the international crises of the 1980s and beyond,3 almost two-thirds 
of Latin American economies have experienced greater volatility in output. What 
accounts for the Dominican Republic’s relative serenity and ability to sustain rapid 
economic growth? 
The paper argues that the Dominican Republic implemented a multifaceted 
development strategy consisting of three main pillars. Each pillar builds on the others, 
providing a stable base on which to grow and develop the economy. Individually, the 
pillars cannot explain success, but rather, in conjunction with each other they provide 
the appropriate conditions for economic progress.  
The individual policies making up the three pillars have been pursued in other 
economies and in other circumstances, but it is argued that in isolation and in their usual 
form they are less likely to succeed in their overall objective. But by pursuing all three 
simultaneously, the Dominican Republic was able to build a strong foundation, enough 
to break away from relatively slow paced and more erratic economic development. In 
                                                 
1 Available  at:  http://data.worldbank.org/indicator 
2 Available  at:  /www.uis.unesco.org/ev.php?ID=2867_201&ID2=DO_TOPIC 
3  Ocampo (2004) documents economic reform efforts and economic performance in Latin America 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s.  
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concert the three sets of policies overcame common economic and political 
impediments to economic growth that were unlikely to be surmounted on their own.  
The first pillar to the development strategy was to build a diversified economic base, to 
provide the foundation for smoothing aggregate income and for withstanding the normal 
gyrations of the world economy. The second pillar involved developing special 
economic zones (parallel economies) that protected the new industries that comprised 
the more diversified economic base. But the protection afforded to those industries was 
not ‘old time’ protectionism from the international economy, but rather protectionism 
from the domestic legal, political and economic infrastructure. These special economic 
zones seemed to have worked well because they provided ideal conditions for the 
success of capital investment, permitting these industries to achieve returns that could 
never have been achieved if they had instead operated in the regular domestic economy.  
The third pillar pursued was to embrace openness to globalization. While many other 
countries have been open to globalizing forces, the special circumstance of the 
Dominican Republic allowed them to take advantage of ‘globalization’ in a more 
fundamental and grassroots basis. As explained, the Dominican Republic’s experience 
with globalization permeates deeper and more generally, differing considerably from 
other countries’ experiences with globalization which tend to be more superficial in 
nature.  
While the strategies, pursued independently of each other, have failed to foster 
economic development in countries around the globe, we show that in combination and 
in the Dominican context, they successfully moved the Dominican Republic onto the 
fast-track for development. Sections 2 through 4 recount the three sets of policies along 
with the environment in which they were implemented. Section 5 synthesizes the 
investigation’s key arguments, stressing the complementarities and synergies that exist 
with respect to the three sets of policies and highlights challenges the Dominican 
Republic faces going forward.  
2  Structural reforms and diversification 
Much lip service has been paid to the idea that developing countries need to diversify 
for the export market. The single commodity exporter may be awash with revenues 
from current world prices for the commodity it produces, but export earnings can 
plummet on account of changes in world market conditions, the entry of new producers, 
or natural disaster. It seems clear that official Dominican policy recognized these perils, 
and as did many other economies, strove to diversify economic production early on, 
accounting for the first pillar of the overall economic programme. The path was not 
smooth and policy needed to be reconfigured along the way. We recount this experience 
below. 
Following the restoration of democracy in the early1960s, after a 30-year dictatorship, 
the Dominican Republic experienced a period of sustained economic growth. From 
1966 through 1976 the economy expanded by nearly 8 per cent per year, realizing one 
of the highest growth rates in the world at the time. Over the period the economy was 
highly concentrated in producing and exporting primary commodities. But large 
fluctuations in revenues tend to be the norm for industries linked to world commodity 
markets and in response the Dominican government embarked on a programme to  
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restructure the real economy, diversifying its production and trade structures away from 
primary commodities.  
At the beginning of the 1970s relatively few commodities accounted for a large share of 
total export earnings: cocoa, coffee, sugar and tobacco. Table 2 shows that these 
commodities amounted to over 70 per cent of total exports, but by the new millennium, 
primary commodities’ share made up less than 5 per cent of total exports.  
The government, assuming a more active role, embarked on a protectionist import 
substitution industrialization (ISI) strategy, similar to programmes implemented in the 
rest of Latin America. Protectionist policies included imposing quantitative and 
administrative restrictions on imports, maintaining overvalued exchange rates and 
directing government investment in key industries (Cardoso and Helwege 1995). The 
initial and most significant programme involved nurturing specialization in 
manufacturing while protecting domestic producers from foreign competition.  
The Industrial Incentive Law (Law 299) introduced in 1968 in conjunction with the 
establishment of the Industrial Development Board, resulted in the implementation of an 
industrial policy, focusing on developing more mining, construction and tourism. Trade 
policy was also legislated, involving the institution of a complex tariff code, additional 
duties, contingents, licenses, prohibitions, exemptions and concessions to specific 
industries, mostly manufacturing domestic industries competing with the importing 
sector. The array of restrictions was coupled with a multiple exchange rate system (see 
Santos-Paulino 2006). Before the 1990 tariff reform, there were 27 fiscal laws that 
administered the regimes applied to imports and 140 different taxes and duties (WTO 
1996).4 
The assembly manufacturing industry began to dominate industrial activity in the 1980s 
with assembly manufacturing employment rising from 16,000 to over 100,000 from 
1980 to 1990 and the sector’s share of exports jumping from 11 per cent to more than 
33 per cent during the period (Dauhajre et al. 1989). Tourism experienced a similar 
expansion with revenues surpassing sugar earnings for the first time in 1984 and 
earnings from all merchandise exports by 1989.  
While industrial policy created the base for promoting and establishing an inexistent 
industrial sector, inefficient policies in tandem with other market imperfections limited 
the outward orientation and success of the domestic industries. That is, after a 
manifested effort by the government to promote industrial development and 
diversification of trade, commercial policy turned inefficient chiefly because it relied on 
the use of complex instruments, mostly in the form of tariffs and non-tariff barriers and 
direct subsidies to specific industries. 
In addition, world events such as the increases in oil prices, the international debt crisis 
and the global recession contributed to the poor performance and brought to surface the 
inadequacies of the system for promoting sustained growth and development.5 The 
                                                 
4   Import prohibitions included textiles, food and electronic products, shoes, cars and luxury items. The 
prohibitions were justified on the grounds of encouraging national production, and to enable the 
country to balance its trade account. 
5  Calvo et al. (1989) is a useful reference for understanding the problems during the 1980s.  
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Dominican Republic was further disadvantaged by the forty-year low in world sugar 
prices and the tightening of US sugar import quotas, significantly reducing Dominican 
sugar exports. The external shocks and unprecedented high interest rates on foreign 
loans pushed the economy into a cycle of balance of payments deficits and growing 
external debt: the culprits of a first-generation exchange rate crisis (Krugman 1979). 
It became evident that the policies, in their current form, were not going to move the 
economy forward. To tackle the late 1980s crisis, a new stabilization and structural 
adjustment reform package was implemented in the early 1990s (Prazmowski 2002). 
The programme included reforms of tariffs and taxes and of the financial system. Tariff 
and tax reforms were aimed at increasing the efficiency of the existing structure while 
maintaining fiscal equilibrium, simplifying the tariff structure, reducing tariff dispersion 
and effective rates of protection and eliminating price distortions.6 The trade policy 
regime became more neutral, increasing the international competitiveness of Dominican 
exports and reducing the anti-export bias documented in Dauhajre (1994).  
While there was progress with these reforms, the Dominican economy still did not 
takeoff. Despite the loans and incentives made available by successive credit incentive 
programmes, progress was not robust. ISI in and of itself could not deliver sustained 
economic development. Furthermore, the autocratic government ruling until 1961 had 
not carried out institutional changes that safeguarded property rights, law enforcement 
and other economically beneficial structures needed to foster competitive market 
structures limiting further the ability for the Dominican incentive programmes to be 
successful.  
A new approach was necessary to deal with this weakness. In response the second 
policy pillar—the creation of parallel economies which could in effect serve as safe or 
special economic zones for the growth of industries seems to have helped overcome this 
deficiency. But what was unique about these special economic zones was that the 
economic units within them were offered protections, not from foreign competition, but 
rather from domestic inefficiencies and impediments to progress.  
While the push for production diversification was vigorously pursued in the Dominican 
Republic using techniques similar to those followed elsewhere, success was limited, at 
least in part, because the institutional makeup of the economy could not support the 
success of these new industries. We now turn to the solution of this problem as 
experienced by the Dominican Republic. 
3  Special economic zones  
Pillar two of the Dominican Republic’s development strategy was to encourage real 
economic production, but within the framework of more dependable infrastructure and 
institutions, easing the way for foreign investment in the capital stock of the economy. 
                                                 
6  The September 1990 tariff reform (Decree 339/90) reduced the tariff range initially from 0–200 per 
cent to 5–35 per cent, and then to 0–35 per cent. The tariffs applied to imported inputs and 
intermediate and final goods were reduced. A new tariff code based on the ‘Harmonised System of 
Goods Codification’ was introduced. Tariff exemptions granted to specific sectors under special 
agreements with the government were eliminated and import prohibitions, with a few exceptions, 
were removed.  
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The correct setting for this strategy required first that the 1990s macroeconomic reforms 
were instituted. These were important for encouraging inflows of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) into the Dominican Republic.  
In addition, the congress passed an FDI law eliminating restrictions on foreign 
companies investing in certain economic sectors and allowing the repatriation of profits 
and the channeling of long-term loans. With the macroeconomic reforms and the 
elimination of foreign investment restrictions firmly in place, the Dominican Republic 
concentrated in fostering two industries operating in many respects in a parallel fashion 
with respect to the overall economy: the tourism and the free trade zone (FTZ) 
industries.  
The tourism industry and the FTZs were not fully integrated with the rest of the 
economy and hence operated as parallel economies in what can be described as special 
economic zones. Recognizing the need for special conditions to foster growth and 
development of industry, yet not being able to create these conditions en mass for the 
overall economy, these two sectors were accorded a special status either through formal 
official policy (as with respect to FTZs) or simply due to special circumstances 
necessary for the industry to operate (as in the case of the tourism industry).  
The tourism industry grew rapidly, not in the major population areas, but where the 
necessary natural resources were located in the more remote regions of the nation. It 
was accorded ‘special status’ by virtue of its location. Necessary infrastructure did not 
exist in these areas. Instead, the infrastructure was developed and operated in a fashion 
conducive to the growth of the economy, often privately.  
Given their location, isolation and vintage, tourism and FTZs did not depend on 
overworked and depreciated infrastructure and they were less subject to economic 
distortions and to opaque institutions. These protections from domestic political 
inefficiencies and infrastructure inadequacies seemed to greatly encourage foreign 
investment in these special economic zones. 
Fiscal revenues from tourism grew to US$170 million in 2006 from US$86 million in 
1998.7 Total non-resident air passenger arrivals into the country rose by 72 per cent 
over the same time period, a 9 per cent annual increase.8 In addition, the changing 
structure of the tourism economy in the Dominican Republic contributed toward 
stabilizing economic production. Although net revenues from tourism are sensitive to 
exchange rates and economic conditions in the international economy, the country 
diversified the geography of tourism revenues.  
Figure 2 displays information on the regional source of tourists, indicating greater 
diversification by source region over time. Whereas over 50 per cent of tourists to the 
Dominican Republic were European in 1999, the Dominican Republic smoothed   
the mix by reducing the European percentage to about 43 per cent while increasing the 
percentage originating from the USA and Canada for a combined 48 per cent, helping 
                                                 
7  From Ingresos Fiscales Relacionados con el Turismo, available at: 
http://www.bancentral.gov.do/estadisticas.asp?a=Sector_Turismo. 
8  See footnote 7.  
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the economy better withstand variations in demand for tourism services due to exchange 
rate changes and regional business cycles.  
In the FTZs, light manufacturing along with some service export production developed 
in the major population areas but within the designated zones. The extensive system of 
FTZs, specializing mainly in the production of textiles (e.g., Kaplinsky 1993), has been 
impressive. While operating in parallel fashion to the rest of the Dominican economy, 
they interact and trade with the domestic economy subject to applicable tariffs and 
regulations and through the generation of employment and payment of some operation 
costs. FTZ enterprises are exempt from paying corporate income taxes, construction 
taxes, fees related to the registration of loan agreements, charges concerning transfers of 
real estate and standard import duties. In effect, the FTZs are sheltered from institutions 
that sometimes exact arbitrary payment in time and resources permitting this sector to 
prosper and grow.  
Along with the structural reforms instituted in the early 1990s to make trade policy 
more competitive and thereby promote the FTZs, the government has used publicly 
financed credit to both expand and domesticate the FTZ sector. The incentives were 
established and administered by the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic’s 
Investment Fund for Economic Development (Fondo de Inversiones para el Desarrollo 
Económico—FIDE). The role of such funds in promoting growth and development was 
widely contended at the national level and, in particular, the involvement of the Central 
Bank was questioned.  
The main argument was that the role of the Central Bank is to promote price and 
exchange rate stability and not to perform as a planning office or development agency. 
However, the Central Bank was placed into the business of distributing such incentives 
because of the institutional weaknesses of the ministries and other government 
centralized agencies. The controversy, however, forced its abolishment resulting in a 
decline in public financing for exports, effectively subjecting FTZs to financing in the 
private capital markets by the mid-1990s. Figure 3 and Table 4 show that nonetheless, 
the sector has grown rapidly, attracting most of the foreign capital invested in the 
Dominican Republic and by the year 2000 generating more than 80 per cent of 
merchandise goods exports. 
Nonetheless, the spreading of development to the economy at large requires that 
economic infrastructure of a certain nature permeate the rest of the economy. 
Production diversification mainly in the context of special economic zones cannot, on 
its own, spread economic development to the rest of the economy. How does a nation 
connect and fill in the intervening areas to promote overall development?  
4  Engagement with the rest of the world  
The third pillar of the Dominican Republic’s economic development strategy involved 
allowing and embracing extensive engagement with the rest of the world. This 
engagement has benefited the Dominican Republic, providing resources, stimulating the 
development of important infrastructure and providing a safety valve to reduce 
conditions likely to lead to social unrest. More specifically, the engagement has 
afforded the Dominican labour and capital markets’ greater flexibility. Openness has 
also facilitated the flow of knowledge, of international trade and of human capital to  
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benefit economic development. Engagement with the rest of the world has led to 
investment in infrastructures vital for development and it has reduced the tendency for 
small shocks to generate currency and financial crises.  
Studies that draw an association between openness and economic growth usually focus 
on narrow indicators of openness such as the share of exports in GDP or the volume of 
FDI in relation to the size of the economy. Greater levels of international trade are 
presumed to promote growth by subjecting the economy to outside influences and to 
competition (Lucas 2009). Competition creates pressures for more efficient production 
of output; larger markets facilitate the attainment of economies of scale; technology 
transfers accompanying FDI lead to improvements in the organization of production and 
in factor productivity. While cost efficiencies, economies of scale and technology 
transfers are often cited as contributing towards economic growth, few stress the notion 
that labour migrations can also speed economic growth. And yet, it is this aspect of 
openness that has had such a profound impact on the Dominican economy. 
The Dominican Republic provides a good example of a country that interacts a great 
deal with the rest of the world through avenues other than merchandise trade or FDI. 
Migration and its by-products have stimulated economic growth in a variety of ways, 
making important contributions to the development of the Dominican economy. 
Dominican migration networks, initiated in the 1940s and 1950s with a small number of 
political refugees, have been etched deeper and have become more pervasive with the 
advent of substantial levels of economic migration from the 1960s and onwards 
(Hernández 2004). Dominicans continue to emigrate to the US and Spain and other 
areas, while older emigrant cohorts return home—sometimes on a temporary basis and 
sometimes with the intention to return home permanently.  
Migration flows have had important and profound effects on the Dominican Republic 
by virtue of their size and impacts. Table 5 measures Latin American nations’ migration 
engagement with the rest of the world by summing immigrants with emigrants and 
reporting the result as a share of the total population. The table reveals that in 
comparison to other Latin American countries, the Dominican Republic is the most 
engaged with the rest of the world by this measure. This engagement provides an 
expanded network for human and financial capital to travel to and from the Dominican 
Republic. In a study by Pozo et al. (2011), the significant and large contributions of 
migration openness of the Dominican Republic to the economic growth of the 
Dominican Republic is estimated and shown to be substantial. Migration openness 
influences the Dominican Republic and provides ripe conditions for growth through 
four avenues—trade, capital investments, infrastructure production and macroeconomic 
stability. 
Migration tends to increase trade in goods and services, through what is referred to as 
nostalgic trade.9 The very substantial Dominican population living outside the 
Dominican Republic, in particular in the United States and Spain, has likely contributed 
                                                 
9  See for example Mundra (2005) for discussion of this channel.    
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to the surge in Dominican exports. Exports as a percentage of Dominican GDP was 3 
per cent in 1999, but had risen by 2007 to nearly 6 per cent.10  
There is considerable evidence that return migration has greatly stimulated the 
development and accumulation of both physical and human capital on Dominican soil. 
On a grassroots basis, Portes and Guarnizo (1991) describe the rise of ‘tropical 
capitalists’ from this migration.11 Dominicans acquire entrepreneurial expertise during 
their foreign residencies, they return to the Dominican Republic and establish successful 
businesses that contribute to the diversification of the economic base.  
Along the same lines, using household level data, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) 
trace the use of remittances to further growth in existing Dominican microenterprises. 
The two lines of research seem to be suggesting that return migrants partner with 
remaining kin abroad to build businesses in the Dominican Republic, the former 
providing the human capital, the latter the financial backing for capital expansion. In 
addition studies show that migrants abroad use their financial resources (in the form of 
remittances) to further the education of children in the Dominican Republic (Amuedo-
Dorantes and Pozo 2010). Hence migration has tended to promote investments in 
physical, human and entrepreneurial capital which, in turn, are important for speeding 
economic progress and providing a better springboard to develop the economy. 
Migration is also associated with producing infrastructure and general conditions 
conducive to economic growth. For example, pervasive migration stimulates the 
development of communications services so that family members living in different 
countries and continents can stay in touch with one another. Demands for these 
communication services pave the way for substantial investments in information 
technology. It is well-known that investments in information technology have produced 
large productivity gains (e.g., Jorgenson et al. 2008). These same gains can help propel 
economies onto an upward growth trajectory.  
In addition, remittances sent to family back home, and often living in remote regions of 
a country, provide incentives for financial intermediaries to locate in these remote 
migrant sending areas (see Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2008), further developing the banking 
infrastructure and spreading the wealth from development. Using information from the 
2002 Dominican census, Figure 4 suggests that Dominican provinces with a higher 
proportion of remittance receiving households also have a higher proportion of 
households with telephone service, linking migration with the diffusion and 
development of infrastructure.  
Research also suggests that countries with large remittance inflows tend to have more 
stable capital flows. Sudden stops of capital inflows are less likely to be observed in 
nations that receive substantial inflows of workers’ remittances (Bugamelli and Paterno 
2005). Economic investors expect migrants’ inflows to continue regardless of cyclical 
conditions, reducing the probability of exchange rate and liquidity crises and the 
likelihood that economic investors will repatriate investments during stressful economic 
                                                 
10    Calculated by the authors from ‘Valor de las Exportaciones Nacionales por Año Segun País de 
Destino’ available at: http://www.one.gob.do/index.php?module=articles&func=view&catid=204 ‘and 
World Development Indicators 2009 (see footnote 1).   
11 Solimano (2008) contains papers on the international mobility of talent and economic development.  
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times. The countries can therefore count on more steady access to capital for economic 
growth. For example, the standard deviation of yearly capital inflows12 over the past 
decade for the Dominican Republic is 1.24, a lot lower than that observed for Venezuela 
(2.1) or for Argentina (3.19). At the same time the Dominican Republic has 
significantly more remittance inflows, averaging over the same period 7 per cent of its 
GDP in comparison to Venezuela and Argentina in which cases remittances averaged 
less than 1 per cent of GDP.  
The engagement of the Dominican Republic with the rest of the world appears to have 
nourished and built resiliency into the economy. Continued infusions of physical 
capital, human capital and infrastructure can be directly traced to the migrations of 
Dominicans to other areas around the globe. Periods of negative growth due to the 
financial and banking crises experienced by the Dominican Republic have tended to be 
shorter when compared with other Latin American countries. Migration networks 
continue to feed capital to the nation, helping stabilize the capital markets during 
turbulent times.  
While not escaping the aftermath of global economic shocks, the Dominican economy 
tends to rebound relatively quickly. This is evident in Figure 5 which presents the time 
series of economic growth for eight Latin American nations over the years of the study. 
The periods of negative economic growth experienced in the Dominican Republic never 
persist beyond two years. In the other countries, downturns tend to persist for longer 
periods of time and the recessions appear deeper. The Dominican Republic is less 
sensitive to financial stresses, this resiliency stemming from the ability of the country to 
avail itself of resources from abroad (e.g., remittance inflows) in times of need. In 
addition, migrant networks facilitate the flow of labour (in or out of the country) as 
necessary. Greater labour market flexibility allows for faster speeds of adjustment, 
permitting economies to continue on their growth paths.  
One might ask, is the Dominican Republic different from other countries that engage 
with the rest of the world. If we look at Table 5 several other countries in Latin America 
appear in the same company as the Dominican Republic, with ratios of immigrants plus 
emigrants (as a share of total population) exceeding 10 per cent. But one can argue that 
the Dominican experience is different. First, most of emigration that has taken place in 
many of the countries of Latin America that have experienced considerable out- 
migration can be attributed to longstanding and contentious political conflict, as for 
example in the cases of Nicaragua and Honduras. Alternatively, as in the case of Haiti, 
longstanding out-migration has taken place on account of the severest of economic 
conditions. Haiti has long been the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, with 
massive levels of poverty.  
In either case, whether migrants are political refugees or escaping dire economic 
conditions, there is less desire for those migrants to engage with their home 
communities or consider returning in the longer run. But neither is the case for the 
Dominican Republic. While a vast majority of Dominican emigrants can be classified as 
economic migrants (emigrants seeking to improve their economic standing by migrating 
                                                 
12    Financing via the international capital markets as a per cent of GDP, obtained from World 
Development Indicators 2009 (see footnote 1).  
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to areas with more lucrative work opportunities) the profile of the Dominican emigrant 
does not suggest him or her to have originated from the most poor.  
Using the 2002 Dominican census, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2010) tabulate the 
percentage of households who claim to have a family member abroad according to   
the educational attainment of the household head. About 9 per cent of households with 
heads claiming no education (and thus likely to originate from poor households) report 
having at least one family member abroad. The comparable statistic for heads claiming 
24 years of education (and hence likely to originate from households with a high 
socioeconomic status) is 12 per cent. Comparing across all education levels, the data 
suggest that the likelihood of having a migrant family member rises slightly with 
educational attainment of the head suggesting that the richer the household the more 
likely migration takes place. Nonetheless, the incidence of migration is well represented 
among all socioeconomic groups in the Dominican Republic. 
Being neither a political refugee nor someone from the ranks of the desperately poor, 
the typical Dominican emigrant continues to have considerable contact with the home 
family and home country, contributing toward its progress by sending remittances for 
capital investment, by contributing toward the education of family back home and by 
returning home with entrepreneurial talents. While many Dominican emigrants surely 
contribute to the family for basic needs, there appears to be a substantial level of 
productive investment taking place as well.  
5  What we have learned 
The Dominican Republic pursued a three-pronged approach to growing its economy 
involving production diversification in the context of special economic zones while 
engaging extensively with the rest of the world. The thesis made here is that the three 
sets of policies, in concert, have provided a role model for economic development that 
has proved successful for the Dominican Republic. While these policies, individually, 
have been pursued before, it is the interaction of the three that seem to have propelled 
the country onto a steady path upward. The three policies together have interacted with 
each other in positive ways. 
Industrial policy implemented to promote diversification is more likely to succeed in the 
context of special economic zones because of the protection afforded to the expanding 
industries from inefficient and poor functioning domestic infrastructure. Engagement 
with the rest of the world through migration and its by-products provides resources to 
better the infrastructure, to improve the efficiency of newer industries and to stabilize 
the economy in terms of its social needs. In additions, since migrants from the 
Dominican Republic originate from all walks of life, from the poor, the middle class and 
the rich, and since they originate from both rural and urban areas, they have created 
links all through the economy helping spread the economic gains. 
In concert the three pillars have provided a stable basis for growth and development, but 
the question arises as to whether the continuation of this approach is viable in the long 
run. The Dominican Republic, as other middle income countries, faces the challenge of 
further diversifying its production and trade structures. According to existing research, 
countries wishing to proceed need to diversify their productive frameworks, and evolve  
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from labour-intensive, low-skill production (the FTZ model) to higher value added and 
more skill technology-intensive activities (Hausmann et al. 2007).  
The productivity embodied in exports seems to be a relevant factor. Santos-Paulino 
(2008) finds that export productivity is determined by a country’s fundamentals: real 
income and human capital endowment, alongside key macroeconomic variables like 
exchange rates. Santos-Paulino confirms that there are important differences in the 
export productivity and specialization profiles of countries with comparable per capita 
income levels. The findings highlight the importance of not just the volume of exports, 
but the type of specialization patterns, favored by higher income and more 
technologically developed product categories.  
The results can also be interpreted as evidence of the productivity enhancing effects of 
higher technology manufactured exports and of the productivity limiting effects of 
primary resource based exports. Moving up will likely require a more sophisticated 
workforce, one that is endowed with greater levels of human capital. Concentrating on 
its human resources is important, as is focusing on income distribution.  
The Dominican Republic’s involvement in the global economy has remained strong, as 
shown by the evolution of trade in goods and services, investment flows and family 
remittances, which have a significant share in the economy. But the dual nature of the 
country’s industrial sectors remains a challenge. That is, over and above the incentives 
granted to firms producing under the FTZs regime, agriculture continues to be 
supported through measures like higher than average applied tariffs, direct payments, 
quotas and marketing and price control programmes. Despite the incentive bias, 
manufactures represent over 30 per cent of GDP and over 50 per cent of total national 
exports, compared to the lower value added in agriculture (Santos-Paulino 2010). But, 
as discussed in this and the preceding sections, it is the services industry that dominates 
the Dominican economy, mainly via tourism-related activities. It is important that the 
Dominican Republic continues to diversify the economy and not fall prey to relying on 
a single high-growth sector.  
The benefits accruing to a nation that promotes tourism are a source of concern. The 
claim is sometimes made that a disproportionate level of proceeds from tourism accrues 
to foreign investors, providing little to the local population. For instance, the direct 
contribution of activities related to travel and tourism to the Dominican Republic’s GDP 
has decreased from nearly 7 per cent in the late 1980s to 5 per cent in 2006. Travel and 
tourism employment input as a share of total employment has been 5 per cent, on 
average, during 1988–2006. Export earnings from international visitors and tourism 
goods comprising all indirect tourism-related activities have been variable, generating 
between 42 and 31 per cent of total export.13 
Given that the most popular tourist areas in the Dominican Republic are in remote 
regions of the country and far away from the major population areas, the notion that 
tourism provides few economic opportunities for the general population is pertinent and 
needs to be addressed. All-inclusive pre-paid vacation packages further limit linkages 
and opportunities for the poorer sectors, as visitors in such situations tend to carry little 
                                                 
13 See World Travel and Tourism Council: 
http://www.wttc.travel/eng/Tourism_Research/Tourism_Satellite_Accounting_Tool/  
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cash and they tend to remain in the tourist compounds. While León (2007) finds that, on 
average, the affected Dominican populations expressed considerable satisfaction in 
tourism-dependent occupations, it would be sensible to implement policies to spread the 
gains and the capital investments more widely.  
Continued success with the overall Dominican model will require that production within 
the FTZs evolve from current low-skill production to higher-skill technology-intensive 
production. Low-skill producers will be egged out by newer players entering the global 
market place. The ability to switch gears and move up the ladder will certainly come 
into play in determining whether the Dominican Republic continues to prosper in the 
longer run. Investments in human capital will facilitate such progression and will help in 
fostering the creation of high quality employment (see the related discussion in Alemán 
1996).  
While this inquiry did not address or consider measures of income distribution over 
time, monitoring of such is warranted because political stability and the ability to 
continue shaping the economy in ways that generate economic growth will depend on 
the willingness to share gains from economic growth with the less fortunate. The latest 
UN Human Development Report shows the Dominican Republic in a rather 
unfavourable light with a Gini index of 52 indicating considerably more inequality in 
relation to the US (41), Spain (35), or Uruguay (45).14 Engaging with the rest of the 
world has provided for some relief from possible social disintegration. But it will be 
impingent on those in power to step up and prevent the rise in tension by ensuring that 
gains from the economic progress are more widely shared. 
Other significant issues, ranging from the role of savings mobilization (Thirlwall 2004) 
and dealing with political economy issues (Andújar-Scheker 2008) to the importance of 
consolidating the institutional framework for safeguarding macroeconomic stability, 
mainly fiscal and monetary policies and their relationship to other parts of the 
economy,15 also merit further attention. Reforming fiscal policy institutions is also of 
great importance.  
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Latin America: per capita real GDP growth rate (%) 
Descriptive statistics for 1970-2003 
Country Mean SD  Min  Max  Kurtosis 
Argentina 0.27  5.40 -10.56 10.68 2.35 
Bolivia  0.46 2.74 -8.00 4.75 4.42 
Brazil 2.02  4.19 -6.87  10.39 2.56 
Chile 2.23  5.96 -16.34 10.22 6.12 
Colombia  1.78 1.82 -2.04 6.65 3.18 
Costa  Rica  1.43 3.32 -9.34 7.70 4.94 
Dominican Republic 3.19  3.84 -5.65  13.04 3.40 
Ecuador 1.64  5.15 -9.25  21.28 7.80 
El  Salvador  0.78 2.84 -7.34 4.89 4.07 
Guatemala  0.63 2.24 -4.00 6.68 3.30 
Haiti* 0.70  5.73 -9.83  12.57 2.96 
Mexico  1.45 3.57 -7.91 6.36 3.65 
Nicaragua -1.58  5.33 -19.13 6.74  5.18 
Panama 2.44  4.47 -9.27  18.53 7.34 
Paraguay  1.51 3.40 -4.45 8.33 2.55 
Peru  0.19 5.78 -16.15 9.77 4.30 
USA  2.07 2.31 -2.92 6.85 2.62 
Uruguay 1.26  5.73 -14.83 10.04 3.65 
Venezuela -0.41  5.39 -11.14 8.45  2.11 
Notes:  Data are from World Penn Tables 6.2 (available at: 
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php).  
  *indicates that this series corresponds to 1971–2000 due to data availability from World Penn 
Tables.  





Dominican Republic: main agricultural and mineral exports (selected years) 
 
Note:    values in million US$, price is US$100,000/ton. Commodities as % of total exports refer to 
cocoa, coffee, sugar and minerals (ferronickel, doré, bauxite). 
Source: UN Comtrade (available at: http://comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx) and FAOSTAT, FAO Statistics 
Division (available at: http://faostat.fao.org/) 
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Dominican Republic: exports and trade balance (selected years) 
Year  Exports  Total exports  Percentage of 
merchandise 
Percentage of total goods & services  Current 
account 
balance 
 Merchandise  Agriculture 
& minerals 






Services (%  of 
GDP) 
1971  151  92  45  243 288 62.1  37.9  52.5  32.0  15.5  -7.8 
1972  183  165  59  348 406 52.5  47.5  44.9  40.7  14.4  -2.4 
1973  182  260  67  442 509 41.1  58.9  35.7  51.2  13.1  -4.1 
1974  334  303  88  637 725 52.5  47.5  46.1  41.8  12.2  -8.2 
1975  565  328  109 894 1,003  63.3  36.7  56.4  32.7  10.9  -2.0 
1976  266  451  121 716 838 37.1  62.9  31.7  53.8  14.5  -3.3 
1977  226  555  144 780 924 28.9  71.1  24.4  60.0  15.5  -2.8 
1978  239  436  150 676 826 35.4  64.6  29.0  52.8  18.2  -6.5 
1979  228  640  262 869 1,131  26.3  73.7  20.2  56.6  23.2  -6.0 
1980  587  630  305  1,217 1,522 48.3  51.7  38.6  41.4  20.0  -10.9 
1981  872  585  317  1,457 1,774 59.9  40.1  49.2  33.0  17.9  -5.4 
1982  594  390  368 984 1,352  60.4  39.6  43.9  28.9  27.2  -5.6 
1983  601  482  451  1,083 1,534 55.5  44.5  39.2  31.4  29.4  -4.8 
1984  730  524  497  1,254 1,751 58.2  41.8  41.7  29.9  28.4  -1.6  
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1985  679  549  579  1,228 1,807 55.3  44.7  37.6  30.4  32.1  -2.1 
1986  895  417  687  1,312 1,999 68.2  31.8  44.8  20.9  34.4  -3.0 
1987  997  501  847  1,498 2,345 66.6  33.4  42.5  21.4  36.1  -6.2 
1988  1,170  793  1,006 1,963 2,969  59.6  40.4 39.4  26.7 33.9  -0.4 
1989  1,351  890  1,032 2,241 3,273  60.3  39.7 41.3  27.2 31.5  -4.9 
1990  1,479  691  1,086 2,170 3,256  68.2  31.8 45.4  21.2 33.4  -4.0 
1991  1,839  610  1,187 2,449 3,636  75.1  24.9 50.6  16.8 32.6  -1.6 
1992  2,302  529  1,337 2,831 4,168  81.3  18.7 55.2  12.7 32.1  -6.3 
1993  2,735  476  1,491 3,211 4,702  85.2  14.8 58.2  10.1 31.7  -4.1 
1994  3,056  397  1,737 3,453 5,190 88.5  11.5  58.9  7.6  33.5  -2.0 
1995  3,318  462  1,894 3,780 5,674 87.8  12.2  58.5  8.1  33.4  -1.1 
1996  3,476  577  2,078 4,053 6,131 85.8  14.2  56.7  9.4  33.9  -1.2 
1997  4,106  508  2,373 4,614 6,987 89.0  11.0  58.8  7.3  34.0  -0.8 
2001  4,929  347  3,024 5,276 8,300  93.4  6.6 59.4  4.2 36.4  -3.0 
 
Note:   Commercial Services exclude government’s services.  



























exports (%)  In millions of US$ 
1980 71  16.4  …  45  …  276  … 
1985 136  30.9  …  45  …  277  … 
1990 331  130.0  …  196  …  850  … 
1991 366  135.3  …  250  …  1,053  … 
1992 404  141.1  307.2  306  …  1,195  … 
1993 462  164.3  297.2  401  1,458  2,609  55.9 
1994 467  176.3  496.7  441  1,616  2,716  59.5 
1995 469  165.6  539.9  512  1,787  2,907  61.5 
1996 436  164.3  576.9  545  1,802  3,107  57.9 
1997 446  182.2  634.3  698  2,273  3,596  63.2 
1998 496  196.0  638.3  827  2,395  4,100  58.4 
1999 473  191.1  701.2  887  2,385  4,332  55.1 
2000 481  195.3  716.5  1,018  2,451  4,771  53.9 
2001 512  175.1  775.5  978  2,275  4,482  50.8 
2002 520  170.1  786.6  947  2,174  4,336  50.1 
Note:   *The surrender requirements for the FTZ foreign exchange earnings were eliminated in 1992. 
Currently, the foreign exchange generated is an estimation of local expenditures of FTZ 
enterprises.  
  ** These exports are for the North American market. 
Source: Dominican Republic's Free Trade Zone National Council, Statistic Report (various issues, 








Latin America: engagement with the rest of the world via migration, 2005 
Country 
Emigrants as a per 
cent of the population 
Immigrants as a 
per cent of the 
population 
Emigrants and immigrants as 
a per cent of the population 
Argentina 2.1  3.9  6.0 
Bolivia 4.6  1.3  5.9 
Chile 3.6  1.4  5.0 
Colombia 4.3  0.3  4.6 
Costa Rica  2.9  10.2  13.1 
Dominican Republic  12.0  1.8  13.8 
Ecuador 7.7  0.9  8.6 
Guatemala 5.4  0.4 5.8 
Haiti 9.8  0.4  10.2 
Nicaragua 12.5  0.5  13.0 
Mexico 10.7  0.6  11.3 
Panama 6.7  3.2  9.9 
Paraguay 6.8  2.7  9.5 
Peru 3.2  0.2  3.4 
Uruguay 8.3  2.4  10.7 
Venezuela 1.7  3.8  5.5 
Source: World Bank (2008).  
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Figure 1 
Dominican Republic: growth rate of real per capita GDP (%) and trend (grey line), 1969–2003 
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Dominican Republic: percent of tourist by geographic region 
 
Note: LA: Latin America. 
Source: computed by the authors using information from the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic 























Dominican Republic: national and FTZs exports 
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Source: Dominican Republic, VIII National Census of Population and Housing, 2002, Data obtained using 





Growth rates of RGDP (Selected Latin American nations) 
 
Source: Penn World Table 6.2. 
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